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Abstract
Political  campaign  spending ceilings are purported to limit the incumbent’s
ability  to  exploit  his  fundraising  advantage.  If  the  challenger  does  not  have
superior  campaign  effectiveness,  in  contrast  to  conventional  wisdom,  we
show  that  the  incumbent  always  benefits  from  a  limit  as  long  as  he  has  an
initial  voter  disposition  advantage,  however  small  and  regardless  of  the
candidates’ relative fundraising ability. If the challenger has higher campaign
spending  effectiveness,  the  effect  of  limits  may  be  non-monotonic.  If  the
incumbent enjoys a mild initial voter disposition advantage, a moderate limit
benefits  the  challenger.  Further  restricting  the  limit  favours  the  incumbent.
Stricter limits may lead to the unintended consequence of increased expected
spending. 
Keywords:  Campaign  Finance  Legislation,  Spending  Cap,  Expenditure
Limit,  Incumbency  Advantage,  Efficiency  in  Fundraising,  Effectiveness  of
Campaign  Spending,  Initial  Voter  Disposition,  All  Pay  Auction,  Contest,
Preferential Treatment Auction.
B O D Y
“[Campaign  spending]  limits are purported to further three objectives:  first,  to
favour  equality,  by  preventing  those  with  greater  means  from  dominating  elec-
toral  debate;  second,  to  foster  informed  citizenship,  by  ensuring  that  some posi-
tions are not drowned out by others .  .  .  ;  third,  to enhance public  confidence by
ensuring equality,  a  better  informed citizenship and fostering the appearance and
reality of fairness in the democratic process.”
Supreme Court of Canada
Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004
1. Introduction
Many modern democracies have political campaign spending limits.Walecki (2007) finds that out
of 60 democracies studied, 25 have caps on political campaign spending including Canada, the UK,
France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, New Zealand and Spain. The Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act of 1883
is  characterized  by  historians  as  a  landmark  in  the  development  of  democracy  in  England.1  The
main  feature  of  the  act  is  its  introduction  of  limits  on  the  election  expenditures  permitted  in  each
constituency. The act was expanded in 2000 under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums
Act.  In  Canada,  spending  limits  for  political  parties  and  candidates  were  first  introduced  in  1974
and they were re-regulated in 2003. Spending limits now are considered a cornerstone of Canadian
democracy.2  Proponents  of  spending  limits  suggest  that  they  enhance  robust  competition  in  the
marketplace of ideas by allowing less established candidates to be heard on an equal footing. Others
however  argue  that  incumbents  would  not  have  legislated  spending  caps  if  limits  did  not  serve
them.3  Proponents and opponents of political campaign spending limits base their arguments on one
of  three  sources  of  asymmetry  between  the  incumbents  and  challengers;  initial  voter  disposition
advantage, efficiency in fundraising and effectiveness in campaign spending.
Opponents of spending limits point to the importance of initial voter disposition advantage. For
example  in  his  dissenting  opinion  in  McConnell  v.  FEC  (2003),4  Supreme  Court  Justice  Scalia
writes:  “If  all  electioneering  were  evenhandedly  prohibited,  incumbents  would  have  an  enormous
advantage. Likewise, if incumbents and challengers are limited to the same quantity of electioneer-
ing, incumbents are favored. In other words, any restriction upon a type of campaign speech that is
equally available to challengers and incumbents tends to favor incumbents.”
The main argument of proponents of spending limits focuses on incumbents’ higher efficiency in
fundraising.  In the U.S. Supreme court case McConnell v. FEC (2003), Justice Stevens argues that
“[I]ncumbents have pre-existing relationships with corporations and unions, and groups that wish to
procure  legislative  benefits  may  tend  to  support  the  candidate  who,  as  a  sitting  officeholder,  is
already in a position to dispense benefits and is statistically likely to retain office.  . . . So we do not
have a solid theoretical basis for condemning [limits] .  .  .  as a front for incumbent self-protection”
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Limits  to  campaign  spending  are  purported  to  limit  incumbent’s  ability  to  exploit  this  fundraising
advantage.
It  is  also  argued  that  spending  limits  affect  the  balance  in  the  electoral  competition  due  to
candidates’  asymmetric effectiveness in campaign  spending.  Incumbents  are already known by the
electorate, whereas challengers often need to campaign just to establish name recognition, providing
an additional benefit to campaigning. The empirical literature provides vast evidence indicating that
challengers  employ  money  more  efficiently  in  terms  of  turning  campaign  spending  into  votes.5
From this empirical evidence Samuels (2001) argues that limiting campaign spending would there-
fore  benefit  incumbents  and  harm  challengers,  with  potentially  deleterious  results  for  democracy.
Interestingly,  we find that spending limits can benefit the challenger only  if  the challenger is more
effective in campaign spending.
Theoretical  literature  focuses  on  these  three  sources  of  asymmetry  between  incumbents  and
challengers  in  isolation.  In  Sahuguet  and  Perisco  (2006)  candidates  differ  only  in  initial  voter
disposition and the spending limit is an impediment to the underdog’s ability to overcome his initial
disadvantage.  Meirowitz (2008)  has results  on the effect  of  a spending limit,  but  only for  the case
where  candidates  are  asymmetric  in  fundraising  efficiency  but  are  symmetric  in  all  other  dimen-
sions. The challenger, who has lower fundraising  efficiency benefits from spending limits if voters
casts  their  ballots  in  favor  of  the  challenger  when indifferent.  In  this  paper  we adapt  the  electoral
contest model of Meirowitz (2008) to examine spending limits where all three sources of asymme-
try may coexist.  We find that allowing for more than one source of asymmetry leads to significant
changes in the predictions of the model. 
Limits  are  intended  to  level  the  playing  field  in  favor  of  the  candidate  with  lesser  resources.
However if the challenger does not have superior spending technology Result 1 of the paper shows
that this premise does not hold as long as the incumbent has any initial voter-disposition advantage,
however  small.  The   limit  always  helps  the  incumbent  with  the  initial  voter  disposition  advantage
irrespective  of  who  is  more  effective  at  fundraising.  The  challenger  must  spend  more  than  the
incumbent  to  overcome  the  incumbent’s  head-start  advantage.  Since  the  maximum the  challenger
can  spend  is  given  by  the  limit,  the  incumbent  never  needs  to  spend  as  much  as  the  limit.  This
implies that the challenger is effectively constrained by the limit while the incumbent is not.
However, if the challenger can turn campaign spending into votes more effectively, we show that
a moderate limit may benefit the challenger when the incumbent has a mild initial voter-disposition
advantage. The incumbent must spend more to effectively match his rival’s campaign spending and
a  mild  initial  voter  disposition  advantage  does  not  overwhelm  this  effect.  Hence  with  moderate
limits the incumbent is effectively constrained whereas the challenger is not. Moreover, we find that
the effect of a spending ceiling may be non-monotonic. While a moderate limit helps the challenger,
further restricting the limit benefits the incumbent.
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Another  assertion  made  for  campaign  spending  limits  is  that  spending  restrictions  can  help  to
restore the efficient  use of  time of  incumbent  politicians.  Fundraising  for  a political  campaign can
distract  the politician  from his  main duties.  If  stricter  limits  lead to  decreased campaign spending,
less  time  is  spent  on  fundraising  and  there  may  be  less  pay  back  in  terms  of  political  favours  to
special  interest  groups.  However,  we find  that,  contrary  to  one  of  its  intentions,  the  imposition  of
stricter limits may lead to fiercer competition and increased fundraising.
This  paper  also  makes  a  small  but  useful  contribution  to  the  auction  literature.  In  the  electoral
contest the winner takes the seat but both players’ costs of effort are sunk. Hence the contest takes
the form of an all-pay auction where one of the contestants has a head-start advantage (initial voter
disposition advantage). Hence the contestant with the head-start advantage is subject to “preferential
treatment” in the auction literature terminology. Konrad (2002) is the first paper to characterize the
equilibrium  of  a  preferential  treatment   all-pay  auction.  Konrad  (2002)  is  extended  by  Meirowitz
(2008)  to  allow  for  asymmetric  marginal  costs  of  bidding  and  Pastine  and  Pastine  (2009)  extend
Konrad  (2002)  to  analyze  the  preferential  treatment  all-pay  auction  equilibrium with  a  cap  on  the
bids. This current paper analyzes a cap in a preferential treatment all-pay auction where contestants
may be asymmetric both  in  the  cost  of  bidding  and in  the  effectiveness of  their  bids.  This  is  non-
trivial because these asymmetries and the preferential treatment interact in the presence of a cap.
Section  2  provides  the  framework of  the  model.  Section  3  presents  the  equilibrium of  the  elec-
toral  contest  with  and  without  a  binding  spending  cap.  Section  4  first  summaries  some  empirical
regularities  relevant  to  the  model  and  then  analyzes  the  implications  of  the  model  for  parameter
values consistent  with these empirical regularities.  Section 5 discusses the results in the context of
the empirical evidence on the effect of spending caps. Section 6 concludes.
2. Framework 
We  consider  a  slightly  generalized  version  of  the  Meirowitz  (2008)  model.  Two  candidates
indexed by ie 81, 2<  run for office. The value of winning the office is the same for both candidates
and it  is  normalized to  one.  Candidates  simultaneously  choose their  campaign spending  levels,  ai .
The  marginal  utility  cost  of  raising  funds  for  campaign  spending  is  denoted  by  bi >0.  Candidates
differ in the efficiency of raising funds; the lower bi , the higher is candidate i’s efficiency of fundrais-
ing.  If i  wins his payoff is 1 - bi ai .  If the opponent  wins candidate i’s payoff  is -bi ai .  Note that
candidate i’s maximum willingness to spend is 1 ê bi  if he were certain he would win the election.
A  continuum  of  voters  observe  the  spending  levels  and  cast  their  ballots  based  on  their  initial
disposition  towards  the  candidates  and  the  spending  of  the  two  campaigns.  The  outcome  of  the
election  is  determined  by  simple  majority.  Each  voter’s  initial  disposition  for  Candidate  1  over
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Candidate 2 is i.i.d. ti ~ U@-a2, a1D . So if t i < 0 voter i  initially prefers Candidate 2.6  After observ-
ing the campaign spending of the two candidates the voter’s utility is: 
(1)ui = ;
ti + h1 a1 if Candidate 1 wins
h2 a2 if Candidate 2 wins
where  h i > 0  is  the  campaign  spending  effectiveness  of  candidate  i.  As  in  Meirowitz  (2008)
campaign spending takes the form of persuasive advertising. In this paper we focus on the persua-
sive role of campaign spending as in, for example, Dixit and Norman (1978).  However campaign
spending can also serve other important functions which will not be captured by this model.7
Through relatively aggressive campaign spending a voter can be persuaded to vote for the candi-
date  he  did  not  initially  prefer.  Voter  i  casts  his  vote  for  Candidate  1  if  ti + h1 a1 > h2 a2 . If  the
inequality  is  reversed  he  votes  for  Candidate  2.  If  he  is  indifferent  he  flips  a  coin.  Since
ti ~ U@-a2, a1D ,  the  median  voter  has  ti = Ha1 - a2L ê2 ª a.  Label  candidates  as  1  and  2  such  that
the majority of voters have an initial predisposition for Candidate 1, a1 > a2  so a > 0.  Candidate 1
wins the election if he can capture the vote of the median voter, i.e. if a + h1 a1 > h2 a2 . Hence the
parameter a gives the initial voter disposition advantage  enjoyed by Candidate 1. In case of equal-
ity, a + h1 a1 = h2 a2 , Candidate 1 wins with probability 1/2.   Following the terminology in Siegel
(2009) refer to a + h1 a1  as the “score” of Candidate 1, and h2 a2  as the “score” of Candidate 2. Let
k  denote the level of the campaign spending ceiling, so a candidate’s spending cannot exceed k .8
This  framework  is  identical  to  the  electoral  contest  model  in  Meirowitz  (2008)   except  for  the
explicit inclusion of the degree of effectiveness of campaign effort. Meirowitz (2008)  sets h1=h2=1.
Without  campaign spending  restrictions  b  can  capture  an aggregate  technology  of  fundraising  and
campaign spending effectiveness. This is because in Meirowitz (2008)   i  takes the interpretation of
spending measured in efficiency units. However spending caps limit the face value of spending, not
the efficiency units. Therefore in our framework i  is the monetary value of campaign spending and
the parameters bi  and hi  represent two different sources of asymmetry. With spending limits, it will
be shown that the effects of these two sources of asymmetry are distinctly different from each other. 
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3. Equilibrium
If Candidate 1’s initial voter disposition advantage is severe, a ¥ h2 êb2,  with or without spending
limits  the  unique  equilibrium  is  in  pure  strategies.  Candidate  2  cannot  overcome  the  head-start
advantage of the rival, even if Candidate 2 were to spend his maximum willingness to spend, 1 ê b 2 ,
and  Candidate  1  spent  nothing.  Hence  neither  candidate  exerts  any  effort.   Likewise  with  a  suffi-
ciently restrictive spending limit, k < a êh2 , the unique equilibrium is in pure strategies where there
is  no  competition.  If  h2 k < a,  Candidate  2  cannot  overcome  the  voters’  initial  disposition  with  a
spending equal to k, even if Candidate 1 exerts no effort. 
Define a “binding cap” as a cap which is lower than the maximum of the upper bounds of the no-
cap equilibrium spending  supports.  A “more restrictive  cap” refers  to  a  smaller k  when the  cap is
binding.  
For each candidate define a¯i  as the maximum amount i  would  be able or willing to spend if  he
knew he would win for sure:
(2)a¯i ª minHk, 1 ê biL
The function MiHa jL  gives the amount candidate i must spend to effectively match the score of his
rival when the rival spends a j :
(3)
M1 Ha2L = Hh2 a2 - aL êh1
M2 Ha1L = Hh1 a1 + aL êh2
By  construction  these  functions  are  inverses  of  each  other.  Candidate  1  is  referred  to  as  the
“strong” candidate if his maximum willingness or ability to spend meets or exceeds what he needs
to spend to effectively match the score of his rival if the rival were to spend his maximum willing-
ness  or  ability  to  spend,  a¯1 r M1 Ha¯2L .  Otherwise  Candidate  2  will  be  referred  to  as  the  strong
candidate.  The  strong  candidate’s  rival  will  be  referred  to  as  the  “weak”  candidate.  Whenever
a¯i > Mi Ha¯ jL  candidate i  has the option of guaranteeing victory and a positive payoff with spending
just above Mi Ha¯ jL  if he desires.
Below we describe the equilibrium for the non-trivial cases where there is competition in equilib-
rium, i.e. where voter’s initial disposition is not too strong, a < h2 êb2,  and the cap is not too restric-
tive,  k > a êh2 .  In  the  interest  of  space  we  ignore  the  non-generic  special  case  k = a ê Hh2 - h1L
where Mi HkL = k .9
The  victor  captures  the  political  seat  but  both  candidates’  costs  of  effort  are  sunk.  Hence  the
electoral contest has the form of an all-pay auction. With and without a cap, the unique equilibrium
is in mixed-strategies. If Candidate 1 were to spend a£ , the optimal response of Candidate 2 would
be  to  spend  enough  to  beat  the  rival’s  score  or  to  spend  zero  if  that  spending  yields  a  negative
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payoff or is not possible due to the spending cap. In either case a£  would be not be the best response
of Candidate 1. 
3.1. Characterization of the Equilibrium
The two propositions below characterize the equilibrium of the electoral contest. The first proposi-
tion  describes  the  equilibrium  for  parameter  values  where  Candidate  1  is  the  strong  candidate,
a¯1 ¥ M1 Ha¯2L .  The second proposition describes the equilibrium for parameter values where Candi-
date  2  is  the  strong  candidate,  a¯1 < M1 Ha¯2L .  The  propositions  are  preceded  by  Lemma  1  and
Lemma 2 that give the parameter values where Proposition 1 and 2 apply without a binding cap and
with  a  binding  cap,  respectively.  To  reduce  unnecessary  notation,  throughout  the  paper  define  the
interval  [b,c]  as  [0,c]  whenever  b<0  and  as  the  empty  set  whenever  b>c  or  c<0.  Similarly  define
open intervals.
Lemma 1: Non-binding cap:
(a)  if   a œ I0, h2ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb2 -
h1ÅÅÅÅÅÅb1 M ,  then  k>maxI
1ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb1 , M2 I
1ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb1 MM  is  not  binding  and  a¯1 < M1 Ha¯2L
without a binding cap. 
(b)  if  a œ A h2ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb2 -
h1ÅÅÅÅÅÅb1 ,
h2ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb2 M,  then k>maxIM1I
1ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb2 M,
1ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb2 M  is  not  binding  and   a¯1 ¥ M1 Ha¯2L
without a binding cap.
Proof:  Appendix.
Without  a  binding  cap  if  each  candidate  were  to  spend  their  maximum  willingness  to  spend,
Candidate  2  would  win  if  a œ I0, h2ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb2 -
h1ÅÅÅÅÅÅb1 M  and  Candidate  1  would  win  if  a œ I
h2ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb2 -
h1ÅÅÅÅÅÅb1 ,
h2ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb2 M .  In
case (a) , Candidate 2 is the strong candidate and in case (b) Candidate 1 is the strong candidate. 
A  cap  greater  than  the  supremum  of  the  no-cap  equilibrium  supports  of  both
candidates, k > maxHa1sup, a2supL  is not binding.  The supremum of the no-cap equilibrium support of
the weak candidate j is given by 1 ê b j . If it were lower than 1 ê b j , the strong candidate would never
spend  more  than  just  enough  to  exceed  the  supremum  score  of  the  weak  candidate.  The  weak
candidate would then have an incentive to deviate by increasing his upper bound to guarantee a win
with a positive expected value. Since the supremum of the equilibrium support  of the weak candi-
date j is given by 1 ê b j , the strong candidate has the upper bound of  MiJ 1ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb j N.
Lemma 2: With a binding cap:
(a) if  kHh2 - h1L < a  then a¯1 ¥ M1 Ha¯2L .
(b) if  kHh2 - h1L > a  then a¯1 ¥ M1 Ha¯2L .
Proof: Appendix.
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At an intuitive  level,  Candidate  1 is strong in the competition if  the binding cap is very restric-
tive.  In  case  (a)  there  is  not  much  scope  for  Candidate  2  to  overcome  Candidate  1’s  initial  voter
disposition  advantage.  Case  (b)  exists  only  if  h 2 > h 1.  When  Candidate  2  is  more  efficient  in
spending,  with  a  higher  spending  limit  Candidate  1’s  initial  voter  disposition  advantage  becomes
relatively  less  important.  Because  Candidate  2  is  more  efficient  in  spending,  at  the  upper  end  of
their equilibrium distributions Candidate 1 must outspend him in order to win. Hence the spending
cap will effectively only constrain Candidate 1. If the cap is not too restrictive Candidate 2 is able to
use his greater efficiency in spending to gain the strong position in the competition.
With a binding cap asymmetries in the effectiveness in campaign spending and in the efficiency
in  fundraising  have  qualitatively  distinct  effects  on  the  equilibrium  of  the  contest.  In  Meirowitz
(2008)  without  a  cap,  bi êhi  is  captured  by  a  single  parameter,  and  takes  the  interpretation  of  the
cost of raising funds for one effective unit of spending. However when there is a cap, the legislation
puts  a  ceiling  on  the  dollar  value  of  spending.  While  fundraising  efficiency  determines  the  maxi-
mum willingness  to  spend,  the  variation  in  the  effectiveness  in  campaign spending  determines the
identity of the strong candidate when there is a binding cap.    
Note  that  with  a  binding  cap,  only  the  weak  candidate  will  be  effectively  restricted  by  the  cap
and his rival will be able to use that to capture the strong position in the contest. If the weak candi-
date j is effectively restricted by k, then the strong candidate i does not spend more than MiHkL < k .
The reversed inequality, MiHkL > k , would be a contradiction  of j being the weak candidate.
  
Proposition 1.  For k>a êh2  and a œ I0, h2ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb2 M: if  a¯1 ¥ M1 Ha¯2L  then the equilibrium is character-
ized  by  unique  cumulative  density  functions  F1 Ha1L  and  F2 Ha2L  for  Candidates  1  and  2’s  cam-
paign spending respectively:
F1Ha1L =
looooom
n
ooooo
b2ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅh2  Ha + h1 a1L for a1 œ @0, M1 Ha¯2LD
1 for a1 œ HM1 Ha¯2L, ¶L
F2Ha2L =
looooom
n
ooooo
1 - b1ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅh1  Hh2 a¯2 - a L for a2 œ @0, a êh2D
1 - b1ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅh1  h2 a¯2 +
b1  h2ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅh1 a2 for a2 œ I
aÅÅÅÅÅh2 , a¯2E
1 for a2 œ Ha¯2, ¶L
(a)  Expected  values:  EV1 = 1 - b1ÅÅÅÅÅÅh1  Hh2 a¯2 - a L ¥ 0,  with  equality  only  if   a¯1 = M1 Ha¯2L ,  and
EV2 = 0. 
(b)  Expected  spending:  EHa1L = b2  h1ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ2 h2  @Hh2 a¯2 - a L êh1D
2 + H1 - b2 a¯2L@Hh2 a¯2 - a L êh1D  and
EHa2L = b1  h2ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ2 h1 Ba¯2
2 - I aÅÅÅÅÅh2 M
2F .  
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(c) Probability that Candidate 2 wins: prob2 = 1ÅÅÅÅ2  
b2  b1  h2ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅh1 Ba¯2
2 - I aÅÅÅÅÅh2 M
2F .
Proof: Appendix.
Figure 1. Equilibrium Distributions with a Binding Cap when Candidate 1 is Stronger
The equilibrium distribution functions with a binding cap are graphed in Figure 1, hence a¯2 = k .
In equilibrium, contestants are indifferent between all spending levels in the support of their equilib-
rium strategies given the equilibrium distributions of their rival. Since a¯1 ¥ M1 Ha¯2L , Candidate 1 is
willing and able to exceed the maximum score Candidate 2 is willing and able to reach. The strong
candidate (Candidate 1) never exceeds M1HkL+  since the weak candidate (Candidate 2) is restricted
by k. The strong candidate has a probability mass at M1HkL+ . Candidate 2 never spends in the range
H0, a êh2 L,  since he needs to spend at least a êh2  in order to overcome the initial  voter disposition
advantage of Candidate 1. Both the weak and the strong candidates have a probability mass at zero
campaign  spending.  The  probability  masses  at  zero  are  increasing  in  a.  The  higher  Candidate  1’s
initial  disposition  advantage  the  greater  is  the  chance  that  Candidate  2  is  passive  in  his  campaign
effort which allows Candidate 1 to remain passive in campaign spending with positive probability.
Proposition 2. For k>a êh2  and a œ I0, h2ÅÅÅÅÅÅb2 M:  if   a¯1 < M1 Ha¯2L  then the equilibrium is character-
ized  by  unique  cumulative  density  functions  F1 Ha1L  and  F2 Ha2L  for  Candidates  1  and  2’s  cam-
paign spending respectively:
F1Ha1L =
lom
no
1 - b2ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅh2  h1 a¯1 +
b2  h1ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅh2 a1 for a1 œ @0, a¯1D
1 for a2 œ Ha¯1, ¶L
F2Ha2L =
loooom
n
oooo
0 for a2 œ @0, a êh2D
b1ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅh1 Hh2 a2 - a L for a2 œ I
aÅÅÅÅÅh2 , M2 Ha¯1LE
1 for a2 œ HM2 Ha¯1L, ¶L
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(a) Expected values: EV1 = 0, and EV2 = 1 - b2ÅÅÅÅÅÅh2  Hh1 a¯1 + a L > 0.
(b)  Expected  spending:  E Ha1L = h1  b2  a¯1
2
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ2 h2  and  E Ha2L =
b1  a¯1ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ2 h2  Hh1 a¯1 + 2 a L
+ 1ÅÅÅÅÅh2  H1 - b1 a¯1L Hh1 a¯1 + a L .
(c) Probability that Candidate 2 wins: prob2 = 1 - 1ÅÅÅÅ2  
b2  b1  h1  a¯12ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅh2 .
Proof: Appendix. 
Figure 2. Equilibrium Distributions with a Binding Cap when Candidate 2 is Stronger
The  equilibrium  distributions  with  a  binding  cap  are  graphed  in  Figure  2.  Candidate  2  is  the
strong candidate since a¯1 < M1 Ha¯2L . Given that Candidate 1 has a head-start advantage, this case is
only possible if Candidate 2 is more efficient in campaign spending and/or better at fundraising.
In this case the probability  that Candidate 2 wins does not depend on the degree of initial voter
disposition towards Candidate 1 (see Proposition 2(c)). If a increases, Candidate 2 simply becomes
more aggressive to overcome his rival’s greater head start while Candidate 1’s equilibrium distribu-
tion remains the same. Hence Candidate  2’s  probability  of  victory  remains unchanged.  This  is not
the  case  for  parameter  values  where  Proposition  1  applies.  The  stronger  position  of  Candidate  1
allows  him  to  compete  away  all  of  2’s  expected  gains.  Thus  if  a  increases,  Candidate  2  cannot
become  more  aggressive  to  compensate.  This  allows  Candidate  1  to  reduce  his  campaigning  and
still have a higher probability of winning than he did with a lower a.
3.2. Additional Features of the Equilibrium
The model implies that it  may be difficult  to empirically establish whether an existing spending
limit  is  binding.  Natural  intuition  would  suggest  that  there  would  be  a  large  number  of  political
candidates  who  spend  the  maximum  permissible  amount  if  the  spending  cap  were  binding.  For
instance, Evans (2007) reports that campaign spending limits are seldom binding based on the fact
that  candidates  so  rarely  spend  at  the  limit.10  However  a  significant  feature  of  the  equilibrium  is
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that although the cap is binding and alters both candidates’ behavior, neither candidate has a proba-
bility mass at the cap. Hence according to the model, these empirical observations do not necessar-
ily indicate that the limits are not binding.
While  politicians  spend  a  lot  of  time  and  effort  trying  to  raise  money  to  fund  their  political
campaigns, academic research finds only weak evidence that campaign spending affects vote shares
at  the  national  level.  Using  data  on  U.S.  House  633  elections  from  1972  to  1990,  Levitt  (1994)
cannot  identify  statistically  significant  effects  of  incumbent  nor  challenger  campaign  spending  on
electoral outcomes.11 The model implies that in equilibrium there is positive probability that Candi-
date 2 spends more than Candidate 1 but not by enough to overcome the voters’ initial preferences.
Hence the model is consistent with the weak empirical evidence of the effect of campaign spending
on election outcomes. 
4. Results
In  this  section  we  discuss  the  equilibrium  implications  of  the  model  for  the  set  of  parameter
values that are consistent with empirical regularities.  We label Candidate 1 as the incumbent since
incumbents  often  enjoy  the  initial  voter  disposition  advantage  either  due  to  reputation  they  build
over  their  term in  office  or  due  to  their  campaign activities  in  prior  elections.12 As we present  the
results the spending limit will be deemed to “benefit” a particular candidate if the limit increases his
probability of winning and his expected value from the contest.
Result 1: If h1 ¥ h2 , then imposing a binding spending cap or making an existing cap more restric-
tive  benefits  the  incumbent  as  long  as  the  incumbent  has  any  initial  voter-disposition  advantage,
however small. This result holds regardless of the candidates’ relative  fundraising abilities.
Proof: Appendix.
Without  a  cap  on  spending  either  Proposition  1  or  2  may  apply  depending  on  the  candidates’
relative efficiency in fundraising. However with a binding cap if h1 ¥ h2  Candidate 1 is stronger so
Proposition  1  applies  regardless  of  relative  fundraising  efficiency.  Since  the  incumbent  is  more
efficient  in  converting  spending  into  votes  and  he  as  an  initial  voter  disposition  advantage,  the
challenger  must  spend  more  than  the  incumbent  in  order  to  effectively  match  his  score,
M  2 Ha 1L > a 1.  With or without  a cap the supremum of Candidate 2’s spending will  be higher than
the  supremum of  the  incumbent’s.  Hence the  cap will  effectively  only  restrict  the  challenger.  The
incumbent does not need to spend up to the cap in order to match the maximum permissible score of
his  rival,  M1HkL < k .  The  incumbent  is  effectively  unrestricted.  Note  that  the  matching  functions
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depend only on the initial voter disposition advantage and the spending efficiency of the two candi-
dates, not on their fundraising abilities. 
This advantage allows the incumbent to capture a positive expected value from the contest equal
to  1 - b1 M1HkL  (see  Proposition  1(a)).  Hence  as  the  cap  becomes  more  restrictive  the  challenger
becomes more constrained which is to the advantage of the incumbent who is popular a priori. This
decreases the overall aggressiveness of the challenger, which in turn induces less aggressive spend-
ing from the incumbent, leading to decreased expected aggregate spending. With a more restrictive
cap (lower k ), the incumbent's probability  of winning goes up and expected total campaign spend-
ing goes down. The cap always helps the candidate with the head-start advantage. 
This  result  is  different  from  Proposition  6  in  Meirowitz  (2008)  where  there  is  no  head-start
advantage. Meirowitz (2008) finds that the cap may benefit the challenger when the candidates only
differ in efficiency of fundraising as long as the voters resolve ties in favor of the challenger. With-
out  a  head-start  advantage,  candidates  tie  when  they  both  spend  at  the  limit.  This  is  not  the  case
with  a>0.  We  find  that  the  candidate  who  happens  to  be  the  a  priori  popular  candidate  always
benefits from the cap because the cap only effectively restricts his rival.
The  main argument  of  the  proponents  of  spending  limits  is  that  caps put  candidates  with  lesser
means on an equal footing. The main argument of opponents is that caps limit challengers ability to
overcome incumbents’  head  start  with  the  voters.  Result  1  shows that  if  h 1 ¥ h 2,  the argument  of
the opponents of caps always trumps the main argument in favor of caps. No matter how dramatic
the difference in fundraising abilities, the cap always benefits the candidate with a head-start advan-
tage, no matter how small that advantage may be. Since often the incumbent is the candidate with a
head-start advantage the primary argument in favor of caps needs qualifications at best.
To capture a more complete picture of the effect of a spending cap, in what follows, we allow for
h 1 < h 2. There is vast empirical evidence indicating that challengers tend to have higher effective-
ness of campaign spending.13 Incumbents are already known by the electorate. However challengers
often must still  establish name recognition.  This provides  an additional  benefit  to campaigning for
challengers.
In  addition  to  their  initial  voter  disposition  advantage,  incumbents  also  tend  to  have  higher
efficiency in fundraising since they are in a position to deliver political favors to donors. Hence we
discuss the equilibrium implications for b2 > b1 .14  Note that this captures the source of asymmetry
that forms the main argument made in favor of spending caps.
Result 2:  For b1 < b2  and  h1 < h2 , if the incumbent has a large initial voter disposition advan-
tage, a œ A h2-h1ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅb2 ,
h2ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb2 M , a more restrictive campaign spending cap always benefits the incumbent and
always reduces expected spending.
Proof: Appendix.
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In  the  range  of  a  specified in  Result  2,  Proposition  1  applies  with  and  without  a  spending  cap.
The large initial voter disposition advantage overwhelms the advantage the challenger enjoys due to
his  higher  effectiveness  in  spending.  The  imposition  of  a  binding  cap  first  effectively  restricts
Candidate 2 before it restricts Candidate 1 since the supremum of Candidate 2’s no-cap equilibrium
distribution  is  higher,  1ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb2 >M1 I
1ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb2 M .  With  a  binding  cap,  the  expected  spending  of  Candidate  2
decreases.  The cap also drives down the expected spending of Candidate 1  since he never needs to
spend more than M1HkL < k  to guarantee a victory. This leads to an increase in the expected value of
the contest to the incumbent. The more restrictive the ceiling, the higher the expected payoff and the
probability of winning for the incumbent. Even though the challenger is more efficient in spending,
since he starts out so far behind (because a is so large) he must outspend his rival in order to catch
up. The effect of a campaign spending cap is to limit his ability to do so.
Result 3 below shows that the identity of the candidate who captures the strong position depends
on  the  level  of  the  cap  if  the  incumbent  has  a  mild  initial  voter  disposition  advantage,
aœI h2ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb2 -
h1ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb1 ,
h2ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb2 M . When the cap is not binding the incumbent is strong. However with a moderate
binding cap the challenger  captures the strong position.  And with a very restrictive cap, the initial
voter  disposition  advantage  overwhelms the  effectiveness  in  spending  advantage  of  the  challenger
and the incumbent captures the strong position. 
Result 3: For  b1 < b2  and  h1 < h2 ,  if  the  incumbent  has  a  moderate  initial  voter  disposition
advantage,  a œ I h2ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb2 -
h1ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb1 ,
h2-h1ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅb2 M ,  a  moderate  cap  k œ I
aÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅh2-h1 ,
1ÅÅÅÅÅh1  I
h2ÅÅÅÅÅÅb2 - a MM  benefits  the  chal-
lenger. But a very restrictive cap  k < aÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅh2-h1  benefits the incumbent.  The effect of a spending limit
on expected spending is non-monotonic as well. 
Proof: Appendix. 
To prove Result 3 the appendix establishes that: (a) the introduction of a barely binding spending
limit leads to a jump down in the probability that the incumbent wins and in the expected value of
the contest to the incumbent. A barely binding cap also results in a jump up in expected total cam-
paign  spending.  (b)  As  long  as  the  limit  is  moderate; k œ I aÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅh2-h1 ,
1ÅÅÅÅÅh1  I
h2ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb2 - aMM,  a  more  restrictive
limit  causes  a  decrease  in  the  probability  that  the  incumbent  wins  while  increasing  the  expected
value of the contest to the challenger. A more restrictive cap decreases expected total spending. (c)
Reducing the limit from I aÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅh2-h1 M
+  to I aÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅh2-h1 M
-  leads to an increase in the probability that the incum-
bent wins as well as improving the expected value to the incumbent. The reduction in the cap leads
to  an  increase  in  the  expected  campaign  spending  of  the  incumbent.  Further  reductions  in  the
spending  limit  decrease  both  candidates’  expected  spending  while  increasing  the  incumbent’s
expected value and probability of winning.
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For  the  parameter  values  in  Result  3,  Figures  3-5  graph  the  expected  payoffs,  the  expected
campaign spending and the probability that the challenger wins as a function of the level of the cap. 
Figure 3. Expected Payoffs of Incumbent and Challenger
The identity of the strong candidate depends on the level of the cap. When the cap is not binding,
the incumbent is the strong candidate and Proposition 1 describes the equilibrium. When the cap is
binding at a moderate level, the playing field is tilted in favor of the challenger who is more effec-
tive in campaign spending and the equilibrium is characterized in Proposition 2. With a tight spend-
ing ceiling,  it  is  the incumbent who captures the strong position  and the equilibrium is once again
given by Proposition 1 (see Lemma 2). 
Figure 4. Expected Spending of Incumbent and Challenger
When  the  ceiling  becomes  barely  binding,  the  limit  first  hits  the  incumbent  before  it  hits  the
challenger. The supremum of the no-cap equilibrium support of the incumbent is higher than of the
challenger,  M1 I 1ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb2 M>
1ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb2 ,  since  the  incumbent  needs  to  be  aggressive  in  order  to  overcome  the
effectiveness of the campaign spending of the challenger. Imposition of the cap restricts the incum-
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bent, but does not effectively restrict the challenger. Since the incumbent is restricted by the cap, the
challenger can guarantee a win by exceeding the supremum score of the incumbent. This drives the
expected payoff of the incumbent down to zero (Figure 3), and yields a positive expected payoff for
the challenger.  The imposition of the ceiling changes the identity  of the strong candidate.  The cap
tilts  the  playing  field  in  favor  of  the  challenger  which  makes  the  challenger  more  aggressive  in
campaign  spending;  resulting  in  a  jump up  in  the  expected  spending  of  the  challenger  (Figure  4).
This results in a jump up in the probability  that the challenger wins (Figure 5).  The imposition of
the spending cap benefits the challenger.
Figure 5. Probability Challenger Wins
A further decrease in the spending cap leads to a decline in expected spending of both candidates
and the expected payoff of the challenger goes up, as long as the cap is moderate. At k < aÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅh2-h1 how-
ever, the overall  advantage in the contest switches over to the incumbent once again. Even though
the challenger is more effective in spending, the cap is too small for the challenger to catch up with
rival’s  initial  voter  disposition  advantage.  Just  below  aÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅh2-h1  the  identity  of  the  strong  candidate
switches  from  the  challenger  to  the  incumbent,  the  playing  field  tilts  in  favor  of  the  incumbent
which induces more aggressive campaign spending of the incumbent.
Additional  empirical  evidence  can be  used to eliminate some sets  of  parameter values.  Without
spending  limits  incumbents  tend  to  have  a  higher  probability  of  victory.  In  the  2008  U.S.  House
elections,  94  percent  of  incumbents  who  chose  to  run  for  election  were  reelected.  The  average
reelection rate in U.S. House election cycles from 1964 to 2008 is 93 percent. The same figure for
the U.S. Senate is 81 percent. In Canada, prior to the introduction of spending limits, on average 79
percent  of  incumbents  who  re-ran  were  elected.15  Examining  the  probability  of  victory  of  the
incumbent without  spending  limits,  note  that  only  a  subset  of  a  in  the  range specified in  Result  3
may  be  empirically  relevant.  If  aœJ h2ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb2 -
h1ÅÅÅÅÅÅb1 , I
h2ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb2  I
h2ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb2 -
h1ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb1 MM
1ê2N  without  cap  the  incumbent  is
strong  and  EV1>0  however  the  challenger  has  a  higher  probability  of  victory.  This  theoretical
prediction  is  not  consistent  with  empirical  observations.  Only  if  aœJ I h2ÅÅÅÅÅÅb2  I
h2ÅÅÅÅÅÅb2 -
h1ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb1 MM
1ê2, h2-h1ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅb2 N
without cap the incumbent is strong and and has a higher probability of victory (Figures 3-5 apply
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for this range of a). However also note that this range exists only if b2-b1ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ ÅÅÅb1 >
h2-h1ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅh2 , i.e. if the fund-
raising advantage of the incumbent is significant in comparison to the effective spending advantage
of the challenger. 
With these parameter values and a moderate binding cap, the probability that the challenger wins
exceeds 1/2. Whether this theoretical prediction is empirically relevant or not depends on the inter-
pretation of the source of asymmetry in spending effectiveness.The only source of advantage for the
challenger  that  can  help  him  to  catch  up  with  the  incumbent’s  head-start  advantage  is  superior
campaign  spending  effectiveness.  The  challenger  may  have  higher  spending  effectiveness  just
because to him campaign spending has the additional benefit of establishing name recognition while
the  incumbent  already  enjoys  name  recognition.  Under  this  interpretation  of  the  source  of  the
challenger’s spending efficiency it is not believable that he would have a greater than 1/2 chance of
victory. At best he would be able to catch up to the incumbent. Once he establishes the same level
of name recognition his efficiency of spending would be the same as well. Hence the blame for this
counterintuitive  prediction  goes  to  the  linear  technology  of  spending  effectiveness.  In  order  to
capture this interpretation of asymmetry in campaign spending, one would need to specify a technol-
ogy with decreasing returns.16
However under other interpretations for the source of the asymmetry in spending effectiveness  a
greater  than  1/2  chance of  winning  for  the  challenger  is  more plausible.  For  example,  the incum-
bent  has  already  established  impressions  in  voters’  minds  over  the  years  he  has  been  in  office
whereas the challenger is a blank page. Changing people’s minds may be harder than creating a first
impression.17  With this interpretation for the asymmetry in h, it may be possible that the challenger
captures  the  strong  position  with  a  higher  chance  of  winning  if  the  headstart  advantage  is  not  too
severe.  
Finally,  if the incumbent’s initial voter disposition advantage is small, aœI0, h2ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb2 -
h1ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb1 M , without
a spending  limit  the spending effectiveness advantage  of  the challenger  overwhelms the head-start
advantage and the efficiency in fundraising advantage of the incumbent (see Lemma 1). In this case,
without  a  spending  limit,  the  challenger  has  a  higher  probability  of  winning.  This  violates  the
empirical  regularity  that  incumbents  tend  to  have  a  higher  probability  of  victory  than  challengers
when there is no spending limit. 
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5. Relation to Empirical Evidence
In  countries  with  spending  limits  the  debate  on  political  campaign  spending  limit  legislation  is
revived repeatedly  prior  to  each election.  Even in  the  U.S.  where  mandatory  spending  limits were
struck down by the Supreme Court, the effect of expenditure limits is of interest. Public financing of
political  campaigns  in  the  U.S.  has  taken  a  new lease  on  life  with  the  movement loosely  grouped
under  the banners “Clean Elections” or “Fair Elections.” Candidates who choose to participate the
Clean Elections initiative  avail  of  public  funds but  are subject  to  spending ceilings.  If  the Califor-
nian Voluntary Campaign Spending Limit Legislation is ratified via referendum in 2010, more than
a  quarter  of  the  U.S.  population  will  be  living  in  states  with  voluntary  caps  on  campaign
expenditures.18  In  this  section  we discuss  the  effects  of  spending  limits  and  compare the  implica-
tions of the model with findings in the empirical literature.
5.1. Do limits help level the playing field?
Candidates  may  differ  in  their  resources  due  to  varying  degrees  of  access  to  fundraising.  The
main stated aim of campaign spending limit legislation is to create a political system where candi-
dates  with  lesser  resources  can  compete  on  an  equal  footing.  However  our  model  does  not  lend
support  to  this  argument  as  long  as  the  challenger  is  not  more  effective  in  campaign  spending;
Irrespective  of  the  identity  of  the  candidate  with  more  efficient  fundraising  technology,  spending
limits benefit the incumbent with the initial voter disposition  advantage (Result 1). 
 But if the challenger is more effective in campaign spending, the limit may help the challenger
as  long  as  the  limit  is  not  too  restrictive.  In  the  absence  of  a  limit,  if  the  initial  voter  disposition
advantage  of  the  incumbent  is  mild,  the  incumbent  may  need  and  be  able  to  spend  more  than  the
challenger in order to overcome challenger’s effective spending. The imposition of a barely binding
limit then first restricts the incumbent while not effectively restricting the challenger (Result 3). 
Employing  data  on  Canadian  Federal  elections,  Milligan  and  Rekkas  (2008)  show  that  smaller
limits tend to lead to closer elections. This is encouraging, however our model suggests that transfer
of  policy  recommendations  from  one  political  environment  to  the  next  may  be  problematic.  The
effect  of  limits  depends  on  the  political  institutional  framework.  In  parliamentary  systems  with
party discipline (such as in Canada, Brazil etc.) often incumbents do not enjoy the same degree of
name recognition  as  U.S.  Senators,  see  Samuels  (2001).   Hence  while  in  Canada  limits  may  help
challengers, in the U.S. they might benefit incumbents.
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5.1.1. Probability of Victory
Milligan  and Rekkas  (2008)  find  that  campaign spending  limits  do  not  affect  the  probability  of
victory  in  any  meaningful  magnitude.  This  empirical  finding  is  not  inconsistent   with  our  model
since the  model  suggests  that  in  some races  the  spending  limit  will  give  a  boost  to  the  incumbent
while  in  others  it  can strengthen  the  electoral  prospects  of  the  challenger  (Results1-3)  because the
degrees of asymmetries between the candidates tend to vary across different races.
5.1.2. Large versus Small Parties
A policy report by Phillips (2007) on strengthening democracy commissioned by former British
Prime Minister Tony Blair suggests that "[l]owering the national expenditure limit for campaigning
may help small and new parties to compete with the two principal  established parties.” The model
may help shed some light to this discussion. If the larger party can be assumed to enjoy a head-start
advantage in initial voter disposition, the smaller party may need to spend more in order to win the
election. In contrast to the claim above, Results 1 and 2 suggest that a cap on campaign expenditure
may in fact benefit the larger party rather than the smaller party. Furthermore Result 3 suggests that
even if the existing cap benefits smaller parties, it does not necessarily follow that further lowering
the limit will have the same effect.
5.2. Do limits reduce the time and effort spent for fundraising?
Running  for  elections  is  an  expensive  endeavor.  The  need  to  raise  funds  may  take  time  away
from other duties and raises the concern that legislative outcomes may be driven by money. If limits
can help reduce expected campaign spending, they may help to improve the quality of democracy.
Gross, Goidel and Shields (2002) find that in the U.S. from 1978 to 1997 in Gubernatorial elections,
the  existence  of  voluntary  spending  caps  accompanied  by  public  funding  reduced  the  expected
spending of both the incumbent and the challenger. Palda and Palda (1985) employs cross sectional
data from 95 constituencies of Ontario in the 1979 Canadian Federal Elections. The study finds that
a $1 increase in the limit leads to a $0.58 increase in candidate expenditure.19
While empirical evidence seems to be in favor of limits due to a reduction in campaign spending,
the implications of the model call for caution. The effect of a limit on expected spending is shown
to  be  non-monotonic  (Figure  4)  when  the  initial  voter  disposition  advantage  of  the  incumbent  is
mild. A very strict limit can invite more aggressive spending of the incumbent compared to a higher
ceiling. When the limit levels the playing field it can lead to fiercer competition. Contrary to one of
the  intended  consequences  of  spending  limits,  this  may  yield  increased  effort  for  fundraising  and
opens the door wider for monied interest’s influence in policy making.20  
17
6. Conclusion
The  model  makes  a  number  of  simplifying  assumptions  on  voter  behavior  as  well  as  on  the
information  structure  of  the  contestants.  However  as  long  as  one  candidate  as  a  higher  supremum
spending in equilibrium (either in pure or mixed strategies), he would be the first to be restricted by
the  introduction  of  a  barely  binding  cap  whereas  the  rival  would  not  be  effectively  constrained.
Hence  the  rival  would  benefit  from  the  imposition  of  a  barely-binding  cap.  The  identity  of  the
candidate  with  higher  no-cap  equilibrium  spending  support  necessarily  depends  on  the  relative
effectiveness of candidates’ spending and the degree of initial voter disposition advantage, as in this
model.
B A C K M A T T E R
Appendix
Here we consider cases where there is competition in equilibrium: a < h2 ê b2  and k > a êh2 . We
also omit the non-generic case where k = MiHkL § minH1 ê b1, 1 ê b2L.  Let the notation S and W refer
to the strong and weak candidates respectively.
Claim 1. Candidate  W does not put a probability  mass point on any level of spending greater than
zero.  Candidate   S  does  not  put  a  probability  mass  point  on  any  level  of  spending
aS œ H0, MS  Ha¯W LL . There is no equilibrium in pure strategies. 
Proof: Suppose that W ’s lowest mass point in H0, a¯W D  is a ' . MSHa 'L > a¯S  conflicts with the defini-
tion of the weak candidate. If MSHa 'L < a¯S  or if MSHa 'L = a¯S  and k > 1 ê b S  then S would not spend
MSHa 'L  or in the open interval below it as a slight increase in spending to just above MSHa 'L  would
result in a discrete  increase in his probability  of winning.  Therefore W could decrease spending
slightly from a '  with no decrease in his probability of winning.
The  only  remaining possibility  is  that MSHa 'L = a¯S = k . If a ' < a¯W < k then  MW  Ha¯SL < a¯W a
contradiction  of  the  definition  of  S.  Suppose  that  a ' = a¯W = 1 ê bW < k .  S  will  put  no  mass  in  the
open interval below k  as moving it up to k  results in a discrete  increase in the probability  of win-
ning. If S put no probability mass at k then W could reduce spending from a '  with no loss. If S did
put mass at k then W would not win with certainty at a ' = 1 ê bW  and so it would result in a negative
expected  payoff.  a ' = a¯W = k  results  in  the  non-generic  case  where  k = MiHkL  and  is  therefore
omitted.
The symmetric argument establishes that S can have no mass point on a ' œ H0, MS  Ha¯W LL .
Candidate  W  cannot  have  a  mass point  on  any  positive  level  of  spending.  If  in  a  pure-strategy
equilibrium  W  had  zero  spending.  S’s  optimal  response  would  be  a 'S =maxH0, MS  H0L + ¶L .  How-
ever in this case W would prefer MW  Ha 'SL + ¶ > 0. Both of these levels of spending are affordable
and possible since a > h2 ê b2  and k > a êh2 . Hence there is no equilibrium in pure strategies .  á
Claim  2. Candidate  2 puts zero probability on a2 œ H0, a êh2D . 
Proof:  Candidate  2 will  not  choose  spending  of  a2 œ H0, a êh2L  as  zero  spending  wins  with  the
same probability.  Candidate 2  can win with a2 = a êh2  only if a1 = 0. Either this chance is small
enough  that  his  expected  value  is  negative,  in  which  case  he  would  prefer  zero  spending,  or  a
slight increase in his spending would result in a discrete increase in his probability of winning. á
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Claim 3. Candidate  W  has an infimum spending level of zero, aW
inf = 0 and EVW = 0.
Proof:   Suppose aWinf > 0. If MS  IaWinf M>0 then Candidate 1 would never choose aS œ I0, MS  IaWinf MM
as  S  would  be  putting  in  positive  spending  and  would  lose  for  sure  since  the  probability  of  W
having spending of aWinf  is zero by Claim 1.  Claim 1 also implies that the probability of S choos-
ing exactly MS  IaWinf M  is zero, therefore  W  could lower his spending without changing his probabil-
ity  of  winning.  If  MS  IaWinf M<0 then spending of  zero would  give W  the same probability  of win-
ning  as  the  conjectured   aWinf > 0,  a  contradiction.   If  MS  IaWinf M=0  then  S=1 and  aWinf = a êh2 .  By
Claim 2 the probability of 2  having spending of a êh2  is zero. Hence if a2inf = a êh2  Candidate 2  is
mixing in the open interval above a êh2 . In this case 1 would put no probability at zero spending
by the above argument and by Claim 1 Candidate 1  has no mass point on H0, ¶D . Hence 2’s proba-
bility  of winning with spending of M2 H ¶L = Ha êh2L+  is   approximately zero for small ¶.  So with
spending M2 H ¶L  Candidate  2  is  putting  in positive  spending  for  a negligible  probability  of  win-
ning, hence a2inf ∫a êh2 . a2inf œ H0, a êh2L  is not possible by Claim 2 so 2’s infimum spending must
be zero.  So in all cases aWinf = 0.
Zero  is  in  the  support  of  W’s  mixed strategy. If W=2 then he loses with  certainty  with that
spending  so  EVW = 0.  If  W=1  then,  from the  definition  of  W,  a¯1 < M1 Ha¯2L ,  so  2  will  not  choose
zero  spending  as  he  would  lose  for  sure  and  he  can  guarantee  victory  and  a  positive  payoff  with
spending of M2 H a¯1L . By Claim 2 there is zero probability of a2 œ H0, a êh2D  so 1 has zero probabil-
ity of winning with zero spending. Since aWinf = 0 and W=1, EVW = 0. á
Claim 4. Candidate   W  has  a  supremum spending  of  aW
sup = a¯W  while  Candidate   S  has  a  supre-
mum  spending   of  aS
sup = MS  Ha¯W L  and  EVS = 1 - bS  MS  Ha¯W L ¥ 0,  with  equality   only  if
a¯1 = M1 Ha¯2L .
Proof:  aW
sup = 0  is  not  possible  by  Claim  1.  If  aWsup œ H0, a¯W L  then  S  would  never  set
aS > maxH0, MS  HaWsupLL  since S can win for sure with that spending as the probability of W choosing
aW
sup  is zero by Claim 1. Therefore W could win for sure with spending aW
sup + ¶  yielding a positive
payoff  for  small  enough ¶ ,  a  contradiction  of  Claim 3.  Likewise aS
sup < MS  HaWsupL  allows candidate
W  an  opportunity  to  guarantee  a  positive  payoff  and  hence  contradicts  Claim 3.  Candidate  S  can
win  for  sure  with  spending  of  MS  HaWsupL  so  aSsup = MS  Ha¯W L  and  EVS = 1 - bS  MS  Ha¯W L .  By  the
definition  of  a¯S  this  is  strictly  greater  than  zero  whenever  a¯S > MS  Ha¯W L  and  equal  to  zero  if
a¯S =MS  Ha¯W L .  á
Claim 5. For Candidate 1  spending levels almost everywhere on a1 œ H0, a1supL  and for Candidate 2
spending levels almost everywhere on a2 œ Ha êh2, a2supL  must have positive probability.
Proof: Suppose there were an interval Ht, vL  in Ha êh2, a2supL  where Candidate 2  had zero probabil-
ity of spending in Ht, vL . Then 1  would have zero probability of spending on HM1HtL, M1HvLL  since
he could lower his spending to M1HtL  and have the same chance of winning by Claim 1. But in this
case 2  would never have spending of v + ¶  as he could lower his spending to t , saving v + ¶ - t  in
spending  and  losing  only  F1HM1Hv + ¶LL - F1HM1HvLL  in  probability  of  winning.  By  Claim  1  this
loss in probability is negligible for small ¶ . So if there were an interval of zero probability it must
go all  the way up to ausup ,  which contradicts  Claim 4.  A symmetric argument rules out  ranges of
zero probability for Candidate 1 on H0, a1supL . á
Proof  of Lemma 1
From Claim 4, aW
sup = a¯W  and aSsup = MS  Ha¯W L . With any non-binding cap a¯W = 1 ê bW  hence a non-
binding  cap  requires   k > maxH1 ê bW , MSH1 ê bW LL .  S=2  requires   a¯1 < M1 Ha¯2L  which  implies
M2 Ha¯1L < a¯2 .  So  from  equation  (2),  M2 H1 ê b 1L < 1 ê b 2.  Equation  (3)  yields  a< h2ÅÅÅÅÅÅb2 -
h1ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb1  which
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completes   part  (a).   S=1  requires   a¯1 ¥ M1 Ha¯2L so from (2), 1 ê b 1 ¥ M1 H1 ê b 2L .  Equation (3)
yields a ¥ h2ÅÅÅÅÅÅb2 -
h1ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb1  which completes  part (b).  á
Proof  of Lemma 2
From  Claim  4,  aS
sup = MS  Ha¯W L  and   aWsup = a¯W = minH1 ê bW , kL . Suppose aWsup = a¯W = k ,  hence
aS
sup = MSHkL .  This  must  be  less  than   k  by  the  definition  of  S.  Thus  for  S=2  in  equilibrium,
M2HkL < k  which  yields  Hh 2 - h 1L k > a  which  gives  part  (b).  For  S=1  in  equilibrium  M1HkL < k ,
noting  that  we  are  not  considering  the  non-generic  special  case  where  M1HkL = k ,  which  yields
Hh 2 - h 1L k < a  which gives the result in part (a) as long as k > 1 ê bW . 
If  k > 1 ê bW  then for the  cap to be binding aSsup = MSH1 ê bW L = k § 1 ê bS .   From the definition
of  S,   a¯S ¥ MS  Ha¯W L  with  equality  only  if  S=1.  Hence  the  only  possibility  for  a  binding  cap  with
k > 1 ê bW  is  k = M1H1 ê b2L ,  in  which  case  a¯1 = M1 Ha¯2L .  Therefore  k = I h2ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb2 - aM ëh1 >
1ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb2   which
implies a < Hh2 - h1L 1ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb2 < Hh2 - h1L k  which completes  the proof  of part (a). á
Proof  of Proposition   1  
Claims  2-5  demonstrate  that  in  equilibrium 2 is indifferent among all spending  levels  almost
everywhere on 80< ‹ Ha êh2, a¯2D  and 1  is indifferent among spending levels almost everywhere on
@0, M1 Ha¯2LD .  EV2 = 0  by  Claim  3.  On  a2 œ Ha êh2, a¯2L  Candidate  2  wins  with  probability
F1HM1Ha2LL  as  there  is  zero probability  that  a1 = M1Ha2L  by  Claim 1.  So indifference of  2  in  that
range  implies  F1HM1Ha2LL - b2 a2 = 0.  This  yields  F1Ha1L = b2Ha + h1 a1L êh2  "  a1 œ @0, M1 Ha¯2LD .
Hence 1  has a probability mass of ab2 êh 2  at zero and a mass in the open interval above M1 Ha¯2L
of  1 - b2 a¯2 .  Note  that  this  mass  is  zero  if  the  cap  is  not  binding.  EV1 = 1 - b1 M1 Ha¯2L ¥ 0  by
Claim  4.  On  a1 œ H0, M1 Ha¯2LL  candidate  1  wins  with  probability  F2HM2Ha1LL  as  there  is  zero
probability  that  a2 = M2Ha1L  by  Claim  1.  So  the  indifference  of  1  in  that  range  implies
F2HM2Ha1LL - b1 a1 = 1 - b1 M1 Ha¯2L .  This  yields  F2Ha2L = 1 + b1 h2 Ha2 - a¯2L êh1  "
a2 œ Ha êh2, a¯2D.  2  has a probability mass of 1 - b1 h2 a¯2 êh1  at zero spending. By Claim 2 Candi-
date 2 puts zero probability on H0, a ê h2L .
Part (a) Expected Value: Given by Claim 3 and Claim 4.
Part (b) Expected Spending:   On a2 œ Ha êh2, a¯2D the p.d.f. of 2’s spending is f2Ha2L = b1 h2 êh1 .
Hence his expected spending is EHa2L = Ÿaêh2
a¯2 f2HxL x d x . On a1 œ H0, M1 Ha¯2LD  the p.d.f. of 1’s spend-
ing is f1Ha1L = b2 h1 ê h2  and 1  has a probability mass in the open interval above M1 Ha¯2L . Hence his
expected spending is EHa1L = Ÿ0
M1  Ha¯2L f1HxL x d x+@1 - F1 HM1 Ha¯2LLD M1 Ha¯2L .
Part  (c)  Probability   Candidate  2  wins: In equilibrium there is zero probability  of  ties  where
a2 = M1Ha2L  by Claim 1 so the probability that 2 wins is given by prob2 = Ÿaêh2
a¯2 F1HM1HxLL f2HxL d x . á
Proof  of Proposition 2  
Claims  2-5  demonstrate  that  in  equilibrium 2 is indifferent among all spending  levels  almost
everywhere on Ha êh2, M2 Ha¯1LD  and 1  is indifferent among spending levels almost everywhere on
@0, a¯1D .  EV1 = 0  by  Claim  3.  On  a1 œ @0, a¯1L  Candidate  1  wins  with  probability  F2HM2Ha1LL  as
there is zero probability  that a2 = M2Ha1L  by Claim 1. So indifference  of 1  in that range implies
F2HM2Ha1LL - b1 a1 = 0.  This  yields  F 2 Ha2L = b1 Hh2 a2 - aL êh1  " a2 œ Ha êh2, M2 Ha¯1LD .  Hence  2
has  no  probability  on  @0, a êh2D  and  a  probability  mass  in  the  open  interval  above  Ms Ha¯1L  of
1 - b1 a¯1 . Note that this mass is zero if the cap is not binding. EV2 = 1 - b2 M2 Ha¯1L ¥ 0  by Claim
4. On a2 œ Ha êh2, M2 Ha¯1LL  Candidate 2  wins with probability F1HM1Ha2LL  as there is zero probabil-
ity  that  a1 = M1Ha2L  by  Claim  1.  So  the  indifference  of  2  in  that  range  implies
F1HM1Ha2LL - b2 a2 = 1 - b2 M2 Ha¯1L . This yields F1Ha1L = 1 + b2  h1ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅh2 Ha1 - a¯1L  " a1 œ @0, a¯1D . 1  has
a probability mass of 1 - b2 h1 a¯1 êh2  at zero spending.
Part (a) Expected Value: Given by Claim 3 and Claim 4.
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Part  (b)  Expected  Spending:   On  a2 œ Ha êh2, M2 Ha¯1LD the p.d.f.  of  2’s  spending is
f2Ha2L = b1 h2 êh1 and  he  has  a  probability  mass  in  the  open  interval  above  M2 Ha¯1L .  Hence  his
expected spending is EHa2L = Ÿaêh2
M2  Ha¯1L f2HxL x d x+@1 - F2 HM2 Ha¯1LLD M2 Ha¯1L . On a1 œ H0, a¯1D  the p.d.f.
of 1’s spending is f1Ha f L = b2 h1 êh2 . Hence his expected spending is EHa1L = Ÿ0
a¯1 f1HxL x d x .
Part (c) Probability  that Candidate 2 wins: In equilibrium there is zero probability of ties where
a2 = M1Ha2L  by  Claim  1  so  the  probability  that  2  wins  is  given  by
prob2 = 1 - Ÿ0
a¯1 F2HM2HxLL f1HxL d x . á
Proof  of Result  1
Since  h 2 § h 1,  by  Lemma  2  with a binding cap Proposition 1 applies  and  hence
∑EV1ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ∑k =
-b1  h2ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ ÅÅÅh1 < 0  and 
∑prob2ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ ÅÅÅ∑k =
b1  b2  h2ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ2 h1 > 0. By Lemma 1, if a œ A
h2ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb2 -
h1ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb1 ,
h2ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb2 M  then Proposition
1 applies without a cap as well and hence Proposition 1’s subsections also yield the result for the
initial imposition  of the cap.
If  a < h2ÅÅÅÅÅÅb2 -
h1ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb1 , which can occur if the challenger has a fundraising advantage, then by Lemma
1  without a cap Proposition 2 applies and hence the imposition  of a cap switches the equilibrium
from Proposition 2 to Proposition 1. Nevertheless, from the subsections of the propositions, without
a  cap  EV 1 = 0  while  with  a  binding  cap  EV 1 ¥ 0.  Without  a  binding  cap  a¯1 = 1 ê b1  and  hence
prob 1 = 1ÅÅÅÅ2  
b2  h1ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅh2  b1  while  with  a  binding  cap   a¯2 = k  so  prob 1 = 1 -
1ÅÅÅÅ2  
b1  b2  h2ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅh1 Bk
2 - I aÅÅÅÅÅh2 M
2F .  Since
h 2 § h 1, M  2 H1 ê b 1L ¥ 1 ê b 1  so from Lemma 1 a barely binding cap has k = M  2 H1 ê b 1L . From that
and the fact that a < h2ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb2 -
h1ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb1  the incumbent’s probability of victory is higher with a barely binding
cap than with no cap on campaign spending. á
Proof  of Result  2 
Since b 1 < b 2, h2-h1ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅb2 >
h2ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb2 -
h1ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb1  so M1H1 ê b2L < 1 ê b2 . From Lemma 1 part (b) a binding cap has
k § 1 ê b 2.  Hence  for  any  binding  cap  a > Hh 2 - h 1L k  so  Lemma  2  implies  that  Proposition   1
applies.  In  the  absence  of  a  binding  cap  a¯ 1 = 1 ê b 1  and  a¯ 2 = 1 ê b 2.  Therefore   a > h2ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb2 -
h1ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb1
implies a¯ 1 > M  1 Ha¯ 2L  and hence Proposition  1 applies without a cap as well. The subsections  of
Proposition  1 yield the results.  á
Proof  of Result  3
 In  the  absence  of  a  binding  cap  a¯ 1 = 1 ê b 1  and  a¯ 2 = 1 ê b 2.  Therefore   a ¥ h2ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb2 -
h1ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb1  implies
a¯ 1 ¥ M  1 Ha¯ 2L  and hence Proposition  1 applies without a cap.
(a) The introduction of a barely binding limit. From Lemma 1 part (b) a barely binding cap has
k = maxH1 ê b 2, M  1 H1 ê b 2LL .  Since  a < Hh 2 - h 1L ê b 2,  k =   M  1 H1 ê b 2L =I h2ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb2 - aM ëh1 .  Therefore
a¯1 = k ,  a¯2 = 1 ê b 2  and a¯1 < M  1 Ha¯2L  so with a barely binding cap Proposition  2 applies.  Plugging
these  values  into  the  results  in  the  subsections  of  Proposition  1  and  Proposition  2  and  noting  that
a > h2ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb2 -
h1ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb1 proves  that  the  introduction   of  a  barely  binding  limit  leads  to  a  jump  down  in  the
probability that the incumbent wins and a jump up in the expected  total campaign spending.
(b) Making a moderate limit,  k œ I aÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅh2-h1 ,
1ÅÅÅÅÅh1  I
h2ÅÅÅÅ ÅÅb2 - aMM , more restrictive . From the proof of part
(a) and Lemma 2 in this range of k  Proposition  2 applies so its subsections  and noting that a¯1 = k ,
establishes that  in this  range of  k,  making the limit more restrictive decreases  the probability  that
the incumbent wins and decreases  expected total spending.
(c)  Reducing  the  limit  from  I aÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅh2-h1 M
+  to  I aÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅh2-h1 M
- .  From  the  proof  of  part  (a)  and  the  fact  that
a < Hh 2 - h 1L ê b 2 the cap is binding for k = I aÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅh2-h1 M
+ . From Lemma 2 when k > a ê Hh 2 - h 1L  Proposi-
tion 2 applies  and  a¯1 = k  while when k < a ê Hh 2 - h 1L  Proposition   1 applies and  a¯2 = k .  Taking
left  limit  of  the  results in  the  subsections of Proposition 2 and the right limit  of  the  results  in the
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subsections  of  Proposition  1  as  k Ø a ê Hh 2 - h 1L and noting that a < Hh 2 - h 1L ê b 2  and  b 1 < b 2
establishes  that reducing the limit from I aÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅh2-h1 M
+  to I aÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅh2-h1 M
-  leads to an increase  in the probability
that  the incumbent  wins  and  leads to an increase in the incumbent’s  expected campaign spending.
For  all  k < I aÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅh2-h1 M ,  Proposition  1  applies  so  its  subsections  show  that  further  decreases  in  k  will
benefit the incumbent. á
Notes
1 See Seymour (1970).
2 See Walecki (2007).
3 There is some indirect support for the argument. See Evans (2007) and Bender (1988) in the
Canadian and U.S. context, respectively.
4 In  the  U.S.  the  Federal  Election  Campaign Act  (FECA, 1974)  provided  for  ceilings  on
campaign expenditures in Presidential, Senate and House elections. In 1976 however, the
U.S. Supreme Court overruled Section 608(c) of the FECA and deemed expenditure limits
to be unconstitutional (Buckley v. Valeo).
5 Among  others  see  Glantz,  Abramowitz  and  Burkart  (1976),  Jacobson  (1978),  Jacobson
(1981), Welch (1981), Jacobson (1985),  Abramowitz (1988), Green and Krasno (1988), 
Green and Krasno (1990), and Jacobson (1990). 
6 While this structure lends itself to useful interpretation, any continuous distribution of tastes
would  yield  the  same type  of  competition  between  candidates.  All  that  is  needed  is  a
median voter model where voters can be influenced by campaign spending and one candi-
date has a potential head-start advantage. Meirowitz (2008)  generates the same game form
from a different underlying model.
7 Campaign spending may convey information to the electorate, either directly or indirectly
through signaling.  In Soberman and Sadoulet H2007L  campaign advertising provides direct
information about the valence of the candidate à la Butters (1977). The left and right wing
candidates are symmetric in all respects. Hence there are no implications for incumbency
advantage. In Prat H2002L  campaign spending provides indirect information to voters and
campaign finance restrictions result in less informed voters. Therefore limits hurt incum-
bents  that  have  high  valence  and  benefit  incumbents  that  have  low valence.  In  multi-
candidate races campaign spending may also serve a coordinating function, as in Pastine
and Pastine (2002).
8 Incumbents may be able to use resources from their office to campaign for reelection. These
resources  include  mailing  privileges,  the  right  to  weekly  trips  to  their  constituencies,
regular  publications  informing  voters  on  policy  actions  or  plans  for  the  future.  These
appear  in  the  expense  account  of  the  office  and  are not  included  in  the  accounting  of
campaign  expenditure.  These  privileges  effectively  imply  that   there  are  two  different
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levels  of  spending cap for  the incumbent and the challenger.  But in this paper we will
abstract from this issue. 
9 This particular case is non-generic in the sense that for any given level of k , if a , h 1 and/or
h 2 are drawn from continuous distributions there is zero probability of the case occurring.
Nevertheless it is interesting theoretically. In this non-generic case if both players spend the
maximum permitted  amount  they  tie  and  the  contest   is  decided  by  lottery.  Hence the
equilibrium mirrors the equilibrium in Che and Gale (1998) and can be solved using their
approach. If the cap is binding but not too restrictive the players play mixed strategies with
a mass point at the cap and zero probability for a range just below the cap. However if the
cap is very restrictive both players use pure strategies of spending the maximum permissi-
ble amount and hoping to win the lottery.
10 In the UK 2001 general elections, the Conservative and the Unionist parties each spent 83
percent of the spending limit. The Labour Party spent 71 percent of the limit, see Walecki
(2007). Combining all Canadian federal races in the  1997 and 2000 election years,  Milli-
gan and Rekkas (2008) report that 89 percent of all candidates and 66 percent of incum-
bents spent less than 90 percent of their spending limit
11 In Levitt (1994) alternative specifications of spending give statistically significant results
for challenger spending. A one percent increase in challenger spending yields about one
percent increase in vote share. However incumbent spending is insignificant both in levels
and in logs.
12 Using Congressional election data from 1978 American National Election Study, Jacobson
(1981) reports that 50 percent of the sampled voters recall the incumbent’s name, while
only 17 percent of the voters recall the challenger’s name. 40 percent of the voters claim
that family or friends had contact with the incumbent. The same figure for the challenger is
only 11 percent. In the 1997 and 2000 Canadian General Elections, Milligan and Rekkas
(2008) find that incumbents enjoy an 8 percent vote share advantage having controlled for
campaign spending. 
13 See the discussion in the introduction. Additionally, Erikson and Palfrey (1998) and Sam-
uels  (2001)  show that  the  effectiveness  of  increased  incumbent  spending  declines  with
seniority, giving further evidence for the hypothesis that the marginal benefit of spending
declines with name recognition. However, for Brazil Samuels (2001) finds that incumbents
and challengers gain equally from campaign spending. Samuels (2001) attributes this to the
Brazilian political and institutional context which allows the incumbent to gain very little
name recognition from holding office. 
14 Palda (1992) shows that the larger the government wealth in control of the politician and
the more power the politician  has over  the state budget,  the more money the politician
raises for his campaign. Hall and Wayman (1990) shows that politicians with positions of
power in congressional committees are better fundraisers.
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15 Data  comes  from  http://www.punditsguide.ca/files/Incumbency_Table1.html  and
http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/reelect.ph.  In  Brazil  since  1945  in  democratic
elections 69 percent of incumbents who ran for reelection were victorious, Samuels (2001).
16 We thank Todd Kaplan for bringing this point to our attention.
17 The 2008 primary race between Senators Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama may be a good
example of this.
18 The Clean Elections movement has been gaining momentum in recent years putting serious
pressure  on  candidates.  Clean  Elections  have  been  adopted  by  Arizona,  Connecticut,
Maine, Massachusetts, New Mexico, Vermont, North Carolina, and in the cities of Albu-
querque,  New Mexico and Portland,  Oregon.  Maine was the first  state to pass  a Clean
Elections Law which went into effect in 2000. In 2008, 85 percent of successful candidates
accepted voluntary spending limits. Connecticut is the first state to enact Clean Elections
for all state offices. In the first run in 2008, 80 percent of the winners were Clean Elections
candidates.  In  legislative  elections,  the  percentage  of  incumbents  who  opted  for  Clean
Elections where available was 51 percent in 2002, 76 percent in 2004 and 82 percent in
2006 (see http://www.commoncause.org).
19 However the limit varied across constituencies and was set based on expected variation in
travel cost and mailing expenses. Hence it is hard to interpret this result. 
20 See Che and Gale (1998)  and  Pastine and Pastine (2009) for similar intuition for contribu-
tion caps. Stricter contribution caps can lead to an increase in expected contributions.
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